What the Doctor Ordered: Revisiting The Relationship Between Psychiatry and the Law in the UK and Ireland by Kennefick, Louise
WHAT THE DOCTOR ORDERED: REVISITING THE 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW IN THE 
UK AND IRELAND
Louise Kennefick*
A INTRODUCTION
Following decades of protracted debate, the introduction of the 
Criminal Law (Insanity) Act 2006 (the ‘2006 Act’) has once again placed the 
turbulent relationship between psychiatry and the law under the legal 
microscope.
The long anticipated arrival of the 2006 Act brought with it into Irish 
law new definitions of insanity 1 and fitness to be tried2 in addition to a new 
plea of diminished responsibility.3 The question of whether the accused was 
suffering from a ‘mental disorder’ at the time he executed the act (or at the 
time of trial in the case of fitness to be tried) is the primary focus of these 
sections of the 2006 Act. Defined as including mental illness, mental 
disability, dementia or any disease of the mind (apart from intoxication),4 
‘mental disorder’ presents itself as a medical or psychiatric term within a 
legislative setting.
The prominent positioning of ‘mental disorder’, together with the 
retention of the term ‘insanity’, demonstrates that the basis of any discussion 
of the 2006 Act must feature an examination of the hegemonic relationship 
between the two powerhouses which vie for authority in the field of human 
behaviour, namely, psychiatry and the law. In this article, I intend to analyse 
the interplay between these two disciplines within the arena of ‘crime and 
madness’, with a view to having a clear understanding of why the law in 
Ireland is as it is, and whether or not its position is apposite. 
Before commencing this examination, it is worth noting that the law 
and psychiatry both have the unenviable task of dealing with that most evasive 
entity, human behaviour. As a result, neither can ever achieve uniform 
perfection in their conclusions. This is not to say, however, that we should 
simply throw in our daggers and balances on the basis that we at least 
achieved a certain level of justice in terms of the psychiatric and legal 
treatment of mentally disordered offenders, but must use it to motivate 
ourselves to come as close as possible to a flexible, complementary 
relationship between the professions which will ultimately result in the most 
appropriate treatment for the accused. 
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1 See s 5 of the 2006 Act, which replaces the Criminal Lunatics Act 1800 and the Trial of 
Lunacy Act 1883. If an accused person successfully pleaded the defence of insanity prior to the 
inception of the 2006 Act, he or she was held to be ‘guilty but insane.’ However, the use of the 
word ‘guilty’ was considered to be misleading given that the verdict results in an acquittal. See 
People (DPP) v Gallagher [1991] ILRM 339.
2 See s 4 of the 2006 Act which replaces ‘fitness to plead’.
3 S 6 of the 2006 Act. 
4 S 1 of the 2006 Act.
The title of the 2006 Act serves as a pertinent place to begin this 
discussion. 
B SAFEGUARDING ‘INSANITY’
The decision by the legislature to preserve the word ‘insanity’, both in 
the title of the 2006 Act and in the ‘not guilty by reason of insanity’ verdict 
itself, is significant. Some commentators would argue that ‘insanity’ is a relic 
of an old and now outdated forensic and clinical nosology which has long 
since passed out of the medical lexicon and is manifestly out of place in a 
society that seeks to avoid language with any pejorative connotation.5 
According to Casey and Craven, ‘insanity’ is best regarded as a legal tag 
without any diagnostic or therapeutic value, and its characterisation is a 
source of bewilderment to medical practitioners.6 
Others, however, are of the view that the concept of insanity in a legal 
context is a perfectly valid and absolute doctrine in its own right.7 For 
example, Gordon maintains that the law is concerned with the accused’s 
responsibility and not his mental health.8 This notion is echoed by McAuley 
when he says that, ‘…legal insanity is an excuse for wrongdoing, not a 
diagnosis of the accused’s mental condition’9 with the result that insanity is 
therefore ‘…not a defence because it is a disease … but because it is a species of 
one of the excusing conditions traditionally recognised by the criminal law in 
a civilised society.’10 
While McAuley’s is a valid argument in the substantive sense, 11 he fails 
to look beyond the narrow confines of legal classification. McAuley does not 
acknowledge that the word ‘insanity’ in modern parlance is still, I would 
argue, tainted with a host of undesirable associations (not least the ‘insane 
asylum’ which although no longer formally in use still commands a certain 
derogatory nuance). Nor does he address why, if ‘legal insanity’ is only 
concerned with responsibility as opposed to mental illness, the law does not 
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5 For example, P Casey and C Craven ‘Psychiatry and the Law’ (Oak Tree Press Dublin 1999) 
367-8.
6 ibid.
7 From an Irish judicial perspective, Griffin J summarises the position succinctly in Doyle v 
Wicklow County Council [1974] IR 55, 72 when he says: ‘… for it is legal insanity with which 
the courts are concerned, and not medical insanity’. Quoted in Casey and Craven, ibid. at n.5.
8 GH Gordon Criminal Law of Scotland (2nd edn Edinburgh 1978) 348.
9 F McAuley ‘Insanity, Psychiatry and Criminal Responsibility’ (Round Hall Press Dublin 
1993) 2.
10 (n 3). This argument is echoed by Deputy B Lenihan when he claims that the legislation 
must be read in the context of the evolution of our criminal law. Seanad Éireann Criminal 
Law (Insanity) Bill 2002: Report and Final Stages 19 April 2005, 180 (B Lenihan).
11 That is:
[T]hat the question of the proper scope of the insanity defence is not an empirical 
matter that can be settled by psychiatrists, … (but that deciding) … whether or 
not the relevant mental disorder should be regarded as an excuse … can only be 
determined by assessing the effects of the disorder in the light of the general 
moral principle on which the insanity defence is based: namely, that an inability 
to act rationally precludes criminal responsibility. (ibid). 
reflect this in its vocabulary instead of reinforcing an outmoded and 
somewhat sullied term. This should surely be of some concern given that it is 
the function of the law to model its procedures around the framework of our 
cultural landscape, which is no longer accepting of the term ‘insanity’ and the 
subtext it begets.
It is as if the law is blind to the fact the word ‘insanity’ once formed part 
of an idiom common to both the medical profession and the legal profession 
alike, but was unceremoniously abandoned by the latter through a dramatic 
and somewhat lengthy course of events, which I shall examine in greater 
detail below. In so doing I hope to resolve the mystery of why one profession 
would take deliberate steps to dissociate itself from insanity and the other 
continue to fortify it.
1 The Slow (but Certain) Demise of ‘Medical Insanity’
According to one school of psychiatrists, the ‘gifting’ of ‘insanity’ from 
medicine to the law was a deliberate action on the part of medical science to 
rid itself of unwanted historical baggage. Prior to the mid nineteenth century 
the word ‘insanity’ was an accepted term which was common to the medical 
and legal professions as well as the general public. It was used to denote the 
‘state of being unsound in mind’ and ‘applicable to any degree of mental 
derangement from slight delirium or wandering, to distraction.’12 However, 
this common acceptance of the term ‘insanity’ (together with the treatment of 
the insane at the time13) would not last; the seeds of change having been 
planted by the emergence of a field of medicine known as psychiatry. 
The private madhouse or asylum which emerged during the period of 
the Enlightenment became what Porter describes as a ‘forcing-house’ for the 
development of psychiatry as an art and science.14 The asylum was not 
established for the practice of psychiatry, rather the practice of psychiatry 
developed in order to manage its inmates. Ideas about insanity remained 
abstract and theoretical before doctors and other proprietors gained extensive 
experience of handling the mad at close quarters in such houses. Inspired and 
encouraged by the optimism of the Enlightenment, however, practical 
psychiatry was transformed through asylum experience, and the claim became 
standard that the well-designed, well-managed asylum was the machine to 
restore the insane to health.15 The common practice of coupling asylums with 
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United States’ (2005) 33:2 J Am Acad Psychiatry L 252, 254.
13 For a concise historical account of madness see R Porter Madness: A Brief History (Oxford 
University Press Oxford 2002). According to Porter, prior to the Enlightenment ‘… it had long  
been assumed that the mad were like wild beasts, requiring brutal taming, and stock therapies 
and drugs had been used time out of mind: physical restraint, bloodletting, purges and 
vomits.’ (at 100).
14 According to Michel Foucault the Enlightenment followed a period of ‘great confinement’ of  
the mad and poor. M Foucault Madness and Civilisation: A History of Insanity in the Age of 
Reason (Pantheon New York 1965). 
15 Porter (n 13).
universities further encouraged the development of a profession whose 
authority was based on their special position in relation to the insane.16
As a result of psychiatry’s new found prowess within society, the law 
had begun to take an interest in the regulation of its institutions.17 However, 
their interaction became more significant when, like psychiatry, the buoyancy 
of the Enlightenment had its effect on the law, which resulted in the firm 
establishment of the legal principle of criminal responsibility owing to the 
‘reason of man’. The position of the law was made clear in R v Hadfield18 
when in defending James Hadfield, (who had shot at the King of England in 
the hope that he would be hanged and therefore obey a divine command to 
sacrifice himself without committing suicide), Thomas Erskine stated that: ‘It 
is agreed by all jurists, and is established by the law of this and every other 
country, that it is the REASON OF MAN which makes him accountable for his 
actions; and that the deprivation of reason acquits him of crime.’19 The 
accused was deemed insane and was sent to a psychiatric institution rather 
than to prison, thus cementing the legal doctrine that those who lack reason 
should be excused from punishment for their crime. 
Accordingly, the insane offender was sent not to jail, but to the asylum 
where he would be confined under the auspices of the psychiatrist, just as the 
prisoner was detained at the pleasure of the court. The responsibility thus 
bestowed upon the psychiatric profession naturally lead to a desire to uphold 
and defend its new found status within society. Its control over the insane, 
coupled with the academic and clinical research being carried out at the time, 
meant that psychiatry wanted the law to recognise its expertise in the 
courtroom. The seeds of a power struggle were thus planted. To begin with at 
least, the potential for conflict between the professions was kept at bay 
because the earliest psychiatric approaches adopted a conception of treatment 
involving individual moral reform through the promotion of self-governance, 
and thus were not far removed from the law’s own ideas on human conduct. 20 
And so for a short period of time, law and psychiatry shared an analogous 
notion of ‘insanity’.
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where teaching and research were pursued alongside clinical work. For a detailed account of 
the early workings of psychiatry see RP Bentall Madness Explained: Psychosis and Human 
Nature (Allen Lane London 2003).
17 For example, in the United Kingdom the Act of Parliament in 1774 emphasised that inmates 
of asylums were to be cured and no longer regarded as hopeless and only in need of asylum, 
and the Act of Parliament 1808 recommended the creation of asylums in every county. For a 
more detailed account see generally Casey and Craven (n 5), and C Unsworth The Politics of 
Mental Health Legislation (Clarendon Oxford 1987).
18 (1800) 27 St Tr 1281. 
19 ibid 1309-10. Quoted in Gordon (n 8).
20 A Norrie Crime, Reason and History: A Critical Introduction to Criminal Law (2nd edn 
Butterworths London 2001) 177. See also Porter’s account of the ‘moral management’ 
approach pioneered by such doctors as Francis Willis who once treated George III, ‘A visitor 
was impressed by the tone of Willis’ Lincolnshire madhouse: “…these were the doctor’s 
patients; and dress, neatness of person and exercise being the principal features of his 
admirable system, health and cheerfulness conjoined toward the recovery of every person 
attached to that most valuable asylum.”’ Porter (n 13).
Such harmony would be short lived. From the mid-nineteenth century 
onwards, questions were being asked about the ability of the professions to 
share the language of insanity. This was set against a backdrop of rising 
doubts about the efficacy of the asylum and moral treatment, intense 
infighting between the superintendents and the newly created speciality of 
neurology, and the general structural changes that were part of the 
reorganisation of the medical profession at the end of the nineteenth 
century.21 Psychiatry was dealing with what was beginning to be considered 
more and more as a disease or an illness, and as such, the profession 
increasingly found itself leaning towards a more scientific or medical 
approach to the study of insanity in terms of both theory and practice, in order  
to seek to explain its underlying cause(s). Following their methodology to its 
natural conclusion, psychiatrists then argued that in actual fact the essence of 
insanity lay in the underlying causal mechanisms of the brain, and not the 
irrational behaviour of an individual (as is the legal position).22 It was this 
assumption (that deterministic mechanisms can equally well explain the 
behaviour of the person) which lead to confrontation between psychiatry and 
the law. 
Thus, in the late nineteenth century, the term ‘insanity’ began to fade 
out of the medical lexicon. Attempts to rename ‘insanity’ were largely 
ineffectual and controversy abounded over attempts to qualify the word by 
various adjectives and modifiers such as adolescent, circular, homicidal, 
religious, moral and delusional. The medical professions which dealt with the 
term failed to agree upon a common meaning, and so, the limitations of the 
old approach became so obvious that they could no longer be avoided.23 
Relentless progress in the field of psychiatric theory such as the 
emergence of a more clinically informed disease classification scheme 
pioneered by Emil Kraepelin and the introduction of psychoanalysis, would 
lead psychiatrists into a new scientific framework. Progress in scientific 
methodologies and models lead to increased disillusionment with, and desire 
to distance theory and practice from, psychiatry’s asylum-dominated past. The 
word ‘insanity’ was seen as representative of this era and so these forces 
combined to lead to psychiatry’s abandonment of the term. This change in 
language was tentative at first, marked by some ill-fated efforts to revive the 
term in an effort to hear the law and medicine speaking the same language, 
however, these attempts were not to come to fruition.24 
Like many decisive moments in history, we cannot mark a particular 
date and time of psychiatry’s abandonment of the term insanity but occur it 
did, as is evidenced by the following quote from the eminent psychiatrist 
William White: ‘Insanity is purely a legal concept and means irresponsibility, 
or incapacity for making a will, or for entering a contractual relationship…’25 
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24 For a more detailed account see generally Tighe (n 12).
25 W White Insanity and the Criminal Law (Macmillan New York 1923) 102. Quoted in Tighe 
(n 12) 256.
Medical textbooks, journals and organisations would soon follow suit in 
eliminating the word ‘insanity’ from their texts.26 By the 1930’s, the term had 
been fully abandoned and psychiatry continued to remain focused on 
developing scientific means for diagnosing, understanding and treating 
mental illness. 
The law, however, demonstrated a marked resistance to change and 
continued to cling fast to the notion of the reason of man.27 Thus, whatever 
revolution psychiatry may have experienced, it did not cross over into the legal 
arena. (However, the law did at least develop procedures through which the 
expert psychiatrists could share their knowledge in the courtroom in order to 
facilitate the making of decisions as to competence and mental condition). 
Embedded in the deliberate movements of each profession is the suggestion 
that the theories underlying law and psychiatry are incompatible. 
2 The Retention of ‘Legal Insanity’
Prior to exploring this apparent theoretical conflict, I would like to 
finish this section with a brief discussion of why the law may have chosen to 
retain the term insanity within its lexicon, even today. We have already 
touched upon when and where the respective ideologies of the professions 
diverged and how this resulted in psychiatry renouncing ‘insanity’. 
Consequently, it is likely that the law retained the term because it was 
reluctant to allow psychiatry to have any meaningful impact upon the law and 
was perhaps threatened by psychiatry’s expertise in the area of human 
behaviour, which it probably felt was its exclusive domain. Perhaps law 
makers, recognising the apparent clash of ideologies, took a step back in order  
to prevent the whittling away of the principle of criminal responsibility so 
embedded in the insanity defence. 
While this reasoning may also apply in today’s legal climate, it does not 
tell us why the law continues to retain the term (even if it does just see it as a 
label for a class of excuse) given its derogatory connotations.28 (This query 
becomes particularly pertinent in an Irish context when we consider that the 
legislature had the ideal opportunity to change this position as recently as 
2006). The fact that civil mental health legislation does not use ‘insanity” may 
give us a clue. The criminal law is keen to retain the term for the very ‘reason 
that it is deeply stigmatic. The word itself can be viewed as counteracting the 
fact that an accused is acquitted when he or she is found not guilty by reason 
of insanity, as it implies that the accused clearly crossed the perceived dividing 
line between the sane and the insane and this is why they have been excused 
63
26 For example, the professional organisation for physicians working with the mentally ill 
made a very public gesture in 1921 by changing its own name to the American Psychiatric 
Association and that of its journal from the American Journal of Insanity to the American 
Journal of Psychiatry. Tighe (n 12) 256. 
27 For example, see R v Kemp [1957] 1 QB 399, 408, where Devlin J states that ‘A defect of 
reason is by itself enough to make the act irrational and therefore normally to exclude 
responsibility in law’.
28 For example, see N Walker Punishment, Danger and Stigma: The Morality of Criminal 
Justice (Blackwell Oxford 1980), wherein Walker puts forward the contention that most of the 
‘labelling’ effects of conviction, sentence and acquittal are, if and when they occur, harmful to 
the individual defendant.
in the eyes of the law. To remove this division would make it more difficult for 
the law to justify its exculpatory verdicts, thus leaving it at risk of being 
branded ‘soft’ on crime.
This idea is supported by the fact that in today’s cultural climate, some 
mental disorders, (for example, depression, anxiety disorders, and eating 
disorders) are frequently diagnosed by psychiatrists and even general 
practitioners, with the result that the stigma that was once attached to them 
has largely evaporated, (particularly given that many children are also 
diagnosed with disorders, for example, attention deficit hyperactivity 
disorder).29 Having a ‘mental disorder’ today is perceived as a relatively 
common, medical complaint and is therefore accepted by society at large, 30 
whereas the notion of being insane (thanks to its chequered history) still 
commands a derogatory undertone. Perhaps the legislature is of the view that 
to remove the word ‘insanity’ from the law would somehow dilute the gravitas 
of the defence which, as it stands, is already suffering from an image crisis.31 
To go one step further and suggest that ‘insanity’ be replaced by ‘mental 
disorder’ may give the damaging impression that individuals could avail of the 
insanity defence by reason only of having a mental disorder (something which 
the law is keen not to encourage).32 Indeed, this notion is reflected in the 
reasoning given by Minister McDowell to the Seanad for his refusal to remove 
the reference to ‘insanity’ in the title of the Act, and replace it with ‘Mental 
Disorder’. He argued that ‘to change the word “insanity” to “mental disorder” 
would send a signal that thresholds were being significantly lowered.’33 
Essentially, what appears to be at play is a balancing act between a 
social perception of being tough on crime and the stigmatisation of the 
mentally disordered acquittee. Clinging onto a pejorative term in the hope of 
maintaining public confidence in the government’s crime agenda is coming at 
the cost of allowing an accused who is excused from responsibility for his 
actions as a result of the effect of having a mental disorder to be free of 
depreciatory intimations. The legislature failed to avail of an ideal opportunity  
to address this anti-defendant bias in Ireland with the implementation of the 
2006 Act.
C MENTAL DISORDER IN THEORY 
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experience of mental illness in respect of people they are close to. 
30 According to the 2005 survey, overall sympathy levels for those who have experienced 
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31 For example, see E Silver and others ‘Demythologizing Inaccurate Perceptions of the 
Insanity Defense’ (1994) 18 L and Human Behaviour 1, 63: ‘Public opinion data show that the 
most prevalent concern expressed regarding the insanity defense is that it is a loophole 
through which would-be criminals escape punishment for illegal acts.’
32 See earlier discussion.
33 Seanad Éireann Criminal Law (Insanity) Bill 2002: Committee Stage (Resumed) 7 April 
2004, 176 (M McDowell)
As previously mentioned, the credence being placed on the term 
‘mental disorder’ in the 2006 Act has resulted in the medicalisation of the 
legislation in this area of the law. This amalgamation of disciplines is curious 
when we consider the time-honoured argument that because the principles of 
law and psychiatry are based on opposing paradigms, they cannot work 
together. Both claim to have a monopoly on understanding human behaviour 
but, paradoxically, appear to approach it from two different standpoints. I 
shall explore these standpoints in turn.
1 The Law and Free Will 
Traditionally, the argument is that the ‘epistemological and purposive 
foundations of the discipline of law are framed by the concepts of free will, 
moral choice, guilt and innocence.’34 Or to put it in more basic terms ‘that 
each individual should be treated as responsible for his or her own 
behaviour’.35 This doctrine flows from the ‘reason of man’ principle which 
owes its origins to R v Hadfield.36 According to Norrie, at the time of its 
emergence, the presence of the principle of rationality within the law 
presupposed the possibility of its opposite, the existence of irrationality. The 
law therefore had to develop a concept of insanity, which it naturally did in 
accordance with its conception of the individual as a reasoning being. The 
legal approach to insanity concerned a test for the absence of rational 
intelligence within the human mind.37 Eventually the test emerged in the form  
of the M’Naghten Rules of 1843 (viz. those where the accused’s condition 
prevented him from knowing either what he was doing in the physical sense or 
that he was acting contrary to law).38
The M’Naghten Rules remain the basis of the law in Ireland today. 
Unlike its English counterpart, however, the new Irish law also incorporates 
the notion of irresistible impulse. This follows from the common law decision 
of Doyle v Wicklow County Council where the Supreme Court recognised the 
existence of the defence of volitional insanity.39 In delivering his judgment, 
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34 Hunter and Bargen ‘Diminished Responsiblity: “Abnormal” Minds, Abnormal Murders and 
What the Doctor Said’ in Meng Heong Yeo (ed) Partial Excuses to Murder (Gault Inc Sydney 
1991) 14. Quoted in McAuley (n 9) 128.
35 A Ashworth Principles of Criminal Law (Oxford University Press Oxford 2006) 25.
36Hadfield (n 18). See also A Kenny Freewill and Responsibility (Routledge & Kegan Paul 
London 1978). The natural logical progression from this principle is that it would be ‘unjust to 
hold individuals criminally responsible for their acts and omissions unless those acts and 
omissions are themselves voluntary or are the foreseeable consequences of other voluntary 
acts and omissions.’ Kenny (n 36) 34.
37 Norrie (n 20) at 176. This test was known as the Arnold test, which provided that the 
defendant ‘must be a man that is totally deprived of his understanding and memory’ (16 St Tr 
695, at 764). McAuley (n 9) 24.
38 (1843) 10 Cl and FIN 200. According to the M’Naghten Rules it must be established that 
cognitive incapacity, ‘defect of reason’ was caused by a ‘disease of the mind’. As such the mere 
fact that an accused suffers from impaired reasoning powers is not sufficient to raise the 
defence of insanity. A causal link between the incapacity and an underlying ‘disease’ is called 
for. See ST Yannoulidis ‘Negotiating “Dangerousness”: Charting a Course Between Psychiatry 
and Law’ (2002) 9 Psychiatry, Psychology and L 2, 151–62, 153.
39 See s 5(1)(b)(iii) of the Act, following the decision in Doyle v Wicklow County Council (n 7).
Griffin J stated that the M’Naghten Rules should be read in light of their 
limitations (i.e. that they were essentially a response to a series of questions 
about the legal effect of insane delusions), and without prejudice to the 
possible exculpatory effect of other forms of serious mental disorder.
2 Psychiatry and Determinism
Over the centuries the ‘free will’ argument associated with the law has 
been contradicted by the ‘determinist’ claim that all human behaviour is 
determined by causes that ultimately each individual cannot control.40 (Or as 
Kenny puts it, ‘If the universe is deterministic, and the body is merely a 
complicated machine, can there by any genuinely free action?’)41 Psychiatry, 
as a branch of medical profession, is naturally informed by a ‘scientific’ 
understanding of human behaviour, and so it concerns itself with 
‘determinism, degrees of cognitive and volitional control, classification of 
diseases, and definition of treatments.’42 As such, the psychiatric concept of 
mental illness is tied to diagnostic categories made up of clinically significant 
behavioural or psychological syndromes or patterns that occur in an 
individual.43 
3 The Conflict
The apparent conflict between psychiatry and the law emerges, 
according to Norrie, from the two contrasting ways of understanding human 
nature (as highlighted above) naturally leading beyond that, to two conflicting 
social ideologies. According to the law, society was made up of rational 
individuals who, if they committed a crime, would be punished for reasons of 
deterrence and justice. The crucial element in this conjunction of utilitarian 
and retributive goals was that the guilty should not escape the sanction of the 
law. Conversely, for the psychiatric profession insanity was not to be viewed as 
a question of irrationality, but as a matter of physiological causation. Thus, 
Norrie would argue, scientific progress put forward a new approach to social 
order, in which the problems of crime would be solved by treating the causes 
of crime within the psyche, not by the punishment of an individual who could 
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40 Hunter and Bargen (n 34) 25. 
41 When addressing this question, Kenny distinguishes between two types of freedom; 
freedom conceived in terms of choice is liberty of spontaneity, and freedom conceived in 
terms of power to do otherwise is liberty of indifference. Ashworth (n 35) 25.
42 McAuley (n 9) 15. According to Kenny, any objections to responsibility that may be put 
forward are generally based on conceptual confusion. The principal objections can be grouped 
into three classes; the epistemological, the metaphysical and the ethical. The metaphysical is 
what we would be concerned with for present purposes. It starts from a presumption that 
science has shown, or made it extremely likely, that determinism is true. Accordingly, so the 
argument goes, if every act of every human being is determined in advance by inexorable laws 
of nature, then it seems unfair to single out particular actions for judgment and reprobation. 
Moreover, it may well seem pointless to try to change or affect people’s actions by 
punishments or the threat of punishments, if everything they will ever do is predictable in 
advance from laws and conditions that obtained before ever they were born. Ashworth (n 35) 
9-10.
43 Norrie (n 20) 154.
not help himself. The aim was not one of retribution but prevention and cure, 
and the old punitive ideology was deemed irrational, ineffective, and unjust.44 
Therefore, what appears on the surface as two differing theories on the 
notion of human behaviour is in fact a much deeper question involving an 
ideological struggle between two differing accounts of the theory underlying 
social and legal order. However, it is worth noting one significant parallel 
between the two professions vying for control, that is, each has a tendency to 
segregate those individuals who are deemed to be either insane or guilty of a 
crime, be that for their own benefit or for the benefit of society. 
4 Compatibility in Theory
Having taken an initial look at the competing theories of law and 
psychiatry, it would not be unreasonable to question how they can co-exist in 
society, let alone in a piece of legislation. However, if we take a pragmatic 
approach to the relationship we can see that the underlying theories can in 
fact complement each other, which in turn leads to a somewhat unexpected 
form of alliance (or collusion) between the professions in practice.
From a theoretical perspective the concepts of free will and 
determinism, although they may appear so on first analysis, are not mutually 
exclusive. In fact, most commentators tend to strike a sensible balance 
between the two notions in order to reflect the fact that routine existence is 
largely based on the assumption that individuals are generally responsible for 
their own actions unless there is some overriding cause which detrimentally 
affects such responsibility, such as mental disorder or duress.45 According to 
Ashworth, such an approach makes acceptable the fundamental proposition 
that behaviour is not so determined that blame is generally unfair and 
inappropriate, yet at the same time, in certain circumstances behaviour may 
be so strongly determined that the normal presumption of free will may be 
displaced.46 Thus, we can see a way for the law and psychiatry to get along, at 
least in theory, but what of practice? 
5 Compatibility in Practice 
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44 Norrie (n 20) 178.
45 For example, see MS Morse Law and Psychiatry Rethinking the Relationship (Cambridge 
University Press 1984), who concludes that ‘… in the fight about a radical rethinking of who 
we are, both law and psychiatry are on the same side in defending an Intentional 
conceptualization of persons as rational and autonomous agents …’ His view is similar to that 
of McAuley who states that: 
… the law’s refusal to abandon the language of moral responsibility is a reflection 
of its abiding commitment to the irreducible facts of human experience, not an 
ostrich-like posture in the face of scientific progress…It is also a serious mistake 
to suppose that psychiatric explanation implies a form of behavioural 
determinism that leaves no room for purposive action. On the contrary, most 
forms of psychiatric disorder coincide with the ability to engage in purposive 
action, and this fact is widely acknowledged by psychiatrist. McAuley (n 9) 15.
46 Hunter and Bargen (n 34) 26. An example of one philosopher who defends the theory that 
free will is compatible with one form of determinism is Kenny. According to Kenny’s 
‘compatabilism’, it is unjust to hold responsible for their actions those who lack the relevant 
freedom, those who could not have done otherwise than they did, but it does not follow from 
determinism that agents always lack the opportunity and ability to do otherwise than they do. 
Consequently it does not follow that it is unfair to hold people responsible for their actions.
The emergence of a form of compatibility between the law and 
psychiatry in practice is largely due to the failure of the M’Naghten Rules to 
effectively reflect society’s expectations as to the administration of the defence 
of insanity. The Rules have been criticised as being, at one level, too wide in 
their application, and at another level, too narrow.47 However, for present 
purposes I wish to focus on their failings in terms of narrowness.
The limitations of the Rules come from the fact that they are essentially  
restricted to cognitive defects, and therefore exclude from the insanity defence 
those forms of mental disorder that involve significant emotional or volitional 
defects.48 There are two limbs to the cognitive component of the Rules. In the 
first limb, the mental disorder must prevent the accused from knowing the 
‘nature and quality’ of his act. Kenny’s famous example of ‘the madman who 
cuts a woman’s throat under the idea that he was cutting a loaf of bread’49 is 
an illustration of a delusion that falls within this limb because there is a 
qualitative difference between what the accused thinks he is doing and what 
he is actually doing, put simply, he is ignorant of the physical nature of his 
act.50 The narrowness lies in the fact that it matters under this test precisely 
what the delusion is, resulting, somewhat absurdly, in the courts having to 
draw lines between delusions. 51  The second limb of the Rules permit the 
accused to show that he did not know that he was doing wrong. Here the law 
is specific that ‘wrong’ means against the law, rather than morally wrong, 
again forcing the jury to pick and choose between delusions.52 
Essentially, the effect of the Rules is to limit the availability of the 
insanity defence to those situations where the accused’s mental disorder 
results in a loss of contact with physical reality (through severe hallucinations) 
or the total disintegration of his moral sense.53 Consequently, as McAuley 
points out, the Rules afford no protection to the person suffering from 
melancholia who kills (usually a loved one and sometimes his whole family) in 
unrealistic despair at the hopelessness of his situation.54 This legal test is a 
narrow, individualistic one which focuses not on the broader social 
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47 For a concise account of the difficulties see Norrie (n 20) 179-182.
48 Hunter and Bargen (n 34) 207. Note that Ireland recognises volitional defects in s 5(1)(b)
(iii) through irresistible impulse.
49 A Kenny Outlines of Criminal Law (19th edn. London 1965).
50 R v Codere [1916] 12 Cr App Rep 21.
51 As Norrie explains, ‘[t]he belief that one is an avenging angel sent by God to kill prostitutes 
may be delusional, but it will not fall within this limb of the test because the accused 
appreciates the nature of his acts (the putting to death of other human beings).’ (n 20) 181.
52 Norrie makes the point that it would in principle make a difference whether a divine 
command to murder someone was a direct instruction to bypass the law of the land in favour 
of a higher law, or whether it advised the insane person that the law of the land had in fact 
been suspended for him. In the latter situation, he would not believe he was breaking the law. 
ibid.
53 According to McAuley, this interpretation essentially reinstates the old Arnold test. (n 36).
54 McAuley (n 9) 24.
circumstances which naturally have a significant impact on the behaviour of 
the accused, but solely on his internal rationality and psyche. 
The law’s restricted interpretation of criminal responsibility left it 
exposed to the potential of being seen to unjustly convict an individual who 
acted under extreme social, emotional and psychological pressure, as in 
McAuley’s example above. If this were to come about, it would shake the very 
foundation of the principle of the reason of man, not to mention the authority 
and the integrity of the criminal legal system. The law therefore was obliged to 
enrol the help of expert psychiatric evidence, which served to extend the 
narrow test of insanity beyond the realm of the M’Naghten Rules.
In short, psychiatry’s broader, deterministic-based theory compensates 
for the law’s lack of forethought in terms of responsibility. In doing so, it also 
serves a greater purpose common to both professions. Psychiatry colludes 
with the law in, (to use Norrie’s terminology), ‘covering up’ the link between 
social context and ‘criminal’ behaviour, thus attributing such behaviour to the 
individual accused rather than to a societal problem. In this way, the law uses 
psychiatric evidence to support its conclusions, as is frequently demonstrated 
by the fact that psychiatric testimony will often overreach not just the legal 
criteria of insanity but its own criteria of what constitutes mental disorder or 
illness where a compassionate or merciful response to crime is required.55 A 
modern example of this collusion in practice can be seen in the plea of 
diminished responsibility, which presents a more open view of the legal and 
psychiatric alliance, particularly when it comes to the case of a mercy killing. 
Where there is a case involving a non-professional defendant the usual 
response is that ‘legal and medical consciences are stretched to bring about a 
verdict of manslaughter by diminished responsibility’.56
According to Yannoulidis, the law’s tendency to rely more and more on 
psychiatry to support its conclusions is testament to the fact that it has 
implicitly conceded that some elements of determinism can be present side by  
side with the notion of free will.57 However, as Barbara Hudson has warned: 
[T]he notion of free will that is assumed in ideas of culpability… is a 
much stronger notion than that usually experienced by the poor 
and powerless. That individuals have choices is a basic legal 
assumption: that circumstances constrain choices is not. Legal 
reasoning seems unable to appreciate that the existential view of 
the world as an arena for acting out free choices is a perspective of 
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56 The Criminal Law Revision Committee 14th Report, [115]; cf Cocker [1989] Crim L R 740 
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57 Yannoulidis would argue that the reason the courts are seeking to legitimise decisions by 
means of an appeal to scientific truth is to pay regard to community perceptions of ‘mental 
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37).
the privileged, and that potential for self-actualization is far from 
apparent to those whose lives are constricted by material or 
ideological handicaps.58
Hudson’s point is reflective of the unfortunate legal practice of 
decontextualising social acts, particularly in terms of madness. The focus on 
responsibility in the insanity defence does not pay heed to the circumstances 
in which madness occurs within society. It serves to isolate the accused and 
consequently his mental condition. Although psychiatry, as I have alluded to 
above, has a wider ambit in terms of compassion and thus is perhaps more 
humane and realistic in its dealings with those suffering from a mental 
disorder, it too is guilty of decontextualisation. It does this by locating the 
problem of insanity in the constitution of the individual, thus hiding the social 
significance of madness by portraying it in terms of individual mental 
disorder.59 Consequently, both psychiatry and the law are guilty of discounting 
the profound social significance of insane crime, thereby calling into question 
their acting systems of conviction, punishment and treatment.
D CONCLUSION
In terms of the 2006 Act, the apparent incompatibility of the respective 
theories underlying the professions (as previously discussed) is reflected in 
the juxtaposition of the term ‘mental disorder’ with ‘insanity’. Whilst ‘insanity’ 
gives the impression that the law in Ireland is somewhat archaic, draconian, 
and still associating itself with redundant terminology from the asylum era, 
‘mental disorder’ suggests something quite different. For the law to decree 
‘mental disorder’ a condition of the pleas of insanity, fitness to be tried and 
diminished responsibility, (coupled with the fact that section 5(1) requires 
that evidence as to the accused’s mental condition must be given by a 
consultant psychiatrist), denotes an acceptance of and an appreciation for 
modern psychiatric diagnoses in the courtroom. This, to me, suggests that the 
law is using ‘insanity’ as its shield against appearing ‘soft’ on crimes against 
the person (as discussed above), while simultaneously falling back on 
psychiatric testimony as to mental disorder in order to ensure that it is not 
perceived as being too narrow, and thus too harsh. In so doing, the law in 
Ireland has failed to recognise the social context of mental illness, and, like its 
predecessor (and indeed its British counterpart) it continues, with the aid of 
psychiatry, to ‘manage’ those who fall outside our social norms.
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